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THE ROBIN HOOD ANTITHESIS - ROBBING FROM THE
POOR TO GIVE TO THE RICH: HOW EMINENT DOMAIN IS
USED TO TAKE PROPERTY IN VIOLATION OF THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT
DANIEL C. ORLASKEY*
"Power tends to corrupt... and absolute power corrupts absolutely."
-Lord Acton (Nineteenth Century Historian)
I. INTRODUCTION
Eminent domain jurisprudence in the United States has slowly
eroded private property rights since the first adjudications of the
validity of government "takings" in the late Nineteenth and early
Twentieth century.' The most notable erosion has occurred under the
"public use" clause of the Fifth Amendment. 2 The line of cases
defining "public use" has had a profound effect on the security of an
individual's right to own property in the United States. Recently, in
Kelo v. City of New London, the United States Supreme Court took the
final step in effectively removing the "public use" clause from the
Fifth Amendment. 3 Consequently, the Constitution no longer offers
any real protection to property owners, and the obvious losers are not
going to be the upper class who can afford drawn out legal battles, but
the lower classes, who cannot.
4
The public outcry towards eminent domain takings has mostly
been directed toward the large corporations that tend to be the eventual
beneficiaries of the government taking.5 This public rancor, however,
is often misdirected. It is the government, not developers, who is to
* J.D. Candidate, University of Maryland School of Law, 2007.
1. See generally Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112 (1896) (holding
that to render the use of water for the irrigation of arid lands a public use, every resident of the
district need not have the right to use the water); see also Mo. Pacific Ry. Co. v. Nebraska,
154 U.S. 403 (1896).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken tor public use, without
just compensation.").
3. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 494 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
4. Id. at 2686-87 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
5. See STEPHEN GREENHUT, ABUSE OF POWER: HOW THE GOVERNMENT MISUSES
EMINENT DOMAIN 190 (2005).
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blame for eminent domain abuse because it gives developers a means
to take the property of others.
6
This article examines the history of the eminent domain issue
and the law upon which it is founded. It also discusses recent
developments and how they have, and will continue to have, a
disproportionate impact on the lives of the lower and middle classes,
while benefiting the rich. The purpose of this article is to point out
where the judiciary has gone wrong and what can be (and is being)
done to stop eminent domain abuse.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Development and Expansion of "Public Use"
The right of government to take private land for public use
originated with the British common law system under which the power
to take private land was considered inherent in the power granted to
the sovereign. 7 William Blackstone explained the origin of this right as
follows:
The reason of originally granting out this
complicated kind of interest, so that the same man shall,
with regard to the same land, be at one and the same
time tenant in fee-simple and also tenant at the lord's
will, seems to have arisen from the nature of villenage
tenure .... [T]hough they were willing to enlarge the
interest of their villeins, by granting them estates which
might endure for their lives, or sometimes by
descendible to their issue, yet did not care to manumit
them entirely ... and for that reason it seems to have
been contrived, that a power of resumption at the will
of the lord, should be annexed to these grants, whereby
the tenants were still kept in a state of villenage, and no
freehold at all was conveyed to them in their respective
lands .... 8
6. Id.
7. See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *105 ("it being a received, and now
undeniable, principle in the law, that all the lands in England are holden mediately or
immediately of the king.").
8. Id. at*148-49.
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Simply put, Blackstone was saying that the Lord retained the
authority to retake land that he had granted to certain vassals.9 The
United States adopted the English common law at the country's
inception and codified the government's right to take private property
for public use in the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.' 0 The Fifth
Amendment's "takings" clause states that no "private property shall be
taken for public use, without just compensation."' 1
In the United States, a basic limitation on the government's
right of eminent domain is that the government may not take land from
a private citizen and give it to another private citizen for a private
purpose. Justice Chase, in the 1793 case of Calder v. Bull, justified this
limitation with the following:
[A] law that takes property from A.[sic] and gives it to
B: It is against all reason and justice, for a people to
entrust a Legislature with SUCH powers; and,
therefore, it cannot be presumed that they have done it.
The genius, the nature, and the spirit, of our State
Governments, amount to a prohibition of such acts of
legislation; and the general principles of law and reason
forbid them.' 2
Originally, "public use" literally meant that the general public
would have the right to use the land that was taken by the government.
These takings, generally, were for public works projects like highways
and railroads.' 3 One of the earliest cases of eminent domain
jurisprudence, for example, was Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold
Mining Company.14 There, the United States Supreme Court held that
the establishment of an aerial bucket line over the property of the
appellant qualified as a "public use." The Court made the following
determination:
9. Id.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
11. Id.
12. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1798) (emphasis in original).
13. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 512 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice
Thomas discussed the early history of eminent domain being for "public goods, such as public
roads, toll roads, ferries, canals, railroads, and public parks." Id.
14. 200 U.S. 527 (1906).
2006]
518 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS
In the opinion of the legislature and the supreme
court of Utah the public welfare of that state demands
that [aerial] lines between the mines upon its mountain
sides and the railways in the valleys below should not
be made impossible by the refusal of a private owner to
sell the right to cross his land.
15
This interpretation of the "public use" doctrine is considered to be
more consistent with the framers original intent.' 
6
The Supreme Court, however, expanded the definition of a
"public use" beyond the literal meaning of the term. In 1954, in
Berman v. Parker, the Court interpreted the "public use" doctrine,
based on the ruling in Strickley, to include those takings that are meant
to remove conditions injurious to the public good. 17 There, the city of
Washington, D.C. used its power of eminent domain to remove
conditions of "blight," which the Court considered a valid "public
use."
18
In Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,19 the Supreme Court
relied on both Strickley - a public use could be economic in nature
20
- and Berman - a public use can include the elimination of blight.2'
The Court ruled that transferring property from one private individual
to another was permissible because of the public benefit gained by
correcting a market deficiency that was deemed to be "injuring the
public . . . welfare., 22 In this case, the Hawaii legislature found that
forty-seven percent of the State's land was owned by only seventy-two
15. Id. at 531.
16. See surpa note 13.
17. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (holding that using eminent domain to
remove conditions of blight was allowable as a "public use").
18. Id. at 29. "Blight" was not specifically defined by the District of Columbia
Redevelopment Act; however, the term "substandard housing conditions" was defined as:
the conditions obtaining in connection with the existence of any dwelling,
or dwellings, or housing accommodations for human beings, which
because of lack of sanitary facilities, ventilation, or light, or because of
dilapidation, overcrowding, faulty interior arrangement, or any
combination of these factors, is in the opinion of the Commissioners
detrimental to the safety, health, morals, or welfare of the inhabitants of
the District of Columbia.
Id at 28.
19. 467 U.S. 229, 232 (1984).
20. See Strickley, 200 U.S. at 527 (holding that the use of eminent domain to support the
mining industry was a valid "public use").
21. See Berman, 348 U.S. at 26 (holding that using eminent domain to remove
conditions of blight was allowable as a "public use").
22. Midkiff 467 U.S. at 232.
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private owners.23 The legislature determined that this land oligopoly
was responsible for driving up land prices, "skewing the State's
residential fee simple market," and, thus, injuring the public welfare. 24
Thus, in both Berman and Midkiff the United States Supreme
Court upheld uses of eminent domain in order to correct a condition
deemed to be injurious to the public 25 - the land oligopoly in Midkiff
and urban blight in the area condemned in Berman.
B. State Interpretations of "Public Use"
State courts, in considering eminent domain rights, have not
always interpreted "public use" as broadly as the United States
Supreme Court. One of the more controversial instances of eminent
domain by local government took place in Detroit, Michigan in 1981
in Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit.26 There, the Michigan
Supreme Court upheld the taking of a large tract of land that
encompassed the Poletown area of Detroit, which was then given to
General Motors for the construction of an assembly plant.27 The only
public benefit accomplished by this taking was the creation of new
jobs and additional tax revenue. 28
The Michigan Supreme Court, however, later overturned
Poletown in County of Wayne v. Hathcock, another case where the
county attempted to take private property for the purpose of economic
development. 29 In Hathcock, the Michigan Supreme Court held that,
despite the ruling in Poletown, such a taking violated the "public use"
requirement of the Michigan Constitution.30 The Michigan Supreme
Court stated that the pursuit of profit by a private entity was never
meant to be considered a "public use" just because the private entity's
increased profits supported the general economy of the area.31
23. Id. An additional forty-nine percent of the State's land was owned by the State and
Federal governments. Id.
24. Id.
25. Compare Berman, 348 U.S. at 26, with Midkiff 467 U.S. at 229. In both cases, the
condition to be remedied through the use of eminent domain was considered to be damaging
to the public good.
26. 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981).
27. Id. at 457 (per curiam).
28. Id. at 467 (Ryan, J., dissenting). No conditions ot biight existed in the area taken. id.
at 640 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).
29. 684 N.W.2d 765, 770-71 (Mich. 2004).
30. Id. at 784. The Michigan Constitution permits the use of eminent domain only for
"public use." MICH. CONST. art. 10 § 2 (amended 2006).
31. Hathcock, 684 N.W. at 786.
2006] 519
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III. KELO V. NEW LONDON
The nine petitioners in Kelo v. New London owned fifteen
properties, in the Fort Trumbull area of New London, Connecticut,
32that the city of New London had condemned. New London planned
to lease the property to a private developer for economic
revitalization. 33 The New London Development Corporation (NLDC),
a private non-profit entity that the city used to plan economic
development, formulated the development plan.
34
Due to many years of economic decline and the closing of the
Naval Undersea Warfare Center in 1996, 35 the state of Connecticut
declared that the city needed economic revitalization. 36 To facilitate
this, the state authorized a bond worth $5.35 million to "support the
planning activities of the NLDC. ' ' 37  Soon after, Pfizer, a
pharmaceutical company, announced that it would be moving to the
area and building a $300 million facility. 38 The city hoped to leverage
this new development in its plan for economic revitalization.3 9 To this
end, the NLDC announced a plan to redevelop ninety acres of land in
the Fort Trumbull area.40 The city approved the plan in 2000 and
authorized the NLDC to use its power of eminent domain to acquire
any property that it could not successfully purchase. 41 The petitioners
were unwilling to sell their homes and, therefore, the NLDC
condemned their property even though there was never a contention
that the properties were blighted or "otherwise in poor condition."
' 2
They were condemned only because they were located in the ninety
acre area the city wanted to redevelop. 4
3
32. 545 U.S. 469, 475 (2005).
33. Id. at 474.
34. Id. at 475. Corcoran Jennison will be the private developer. Id. at 492.
35. Id. at 473. The Naval Undersea Warfare Center had employed over 1,500 people in
the area. Id.
36. Id. at 473-74.




40. Id. at 474. The plan that was approved by the state was divided into seven parcels,
with each parcel having a different use. Id.
41. Id. at 475.
42. Id.
43. Id. Four properties are located in parcel 3 of the development plan and eleven are
located in parcel 4A. Id.
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Petitioners sued the NLDC and the City of New London, in the
New London Superior Court, and claimed that the takings were a
violation of the "public use" clause of the Fifth Amendment.44 The
Superior Court granted the petitioners a permanent restraining order
against taking the properties located in parcel 4A of the development
plan because the plan was vague as to how this particular parcel of
land would be used.45 It upheld the takings of the properties located in
parcel 3.46 Both the petitioners and the respondents appealed to the
Connecticut Supreme Court,47 which overturned the lower court's
grant of a permanent injunction as to parcel 4A.48 The Connecticut
Supreme Court upheld the takings on the grounds that they were
authorized by chapter 132 of the municipal development statute.49
They also referred to Berman and Midkiff to support their finding that
economic development as a public use did not violate the Fifth
Amendment.5 °
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide
the question of whether economic development satisfies the "public
use" requirement. 5 1 In a 5-4 decision the Court upheld the ruling of the
Connecticut Supreme Court, finding the takings to be permissible
under the Fifth Amendment.
52
IV. THE COURT'S REASONING
The majority in Kelo affirmed the Connecticut Supreme
Court's ruling that the use of eminent domain, strictly for the purposes
of economic development, was appropriate under the "public use"
clause of the Fifth Amendment. To justify this holding, Justice
Stevens, writing for the majority, relied on three principles: first, based
44. Kelo v. New London, 843 A.2d 500 (Conn. 2004).
45. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 475-76. In the development plan, this area is listed to be used for
"park support." Id at 495 (O'Connor, J.,dissenting).
46. Id. at 476. Land in this area was to be used for office space. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. The Connecticut Supreme Court held that the use assigned to parcel 4A in the
development plan was sufficiently clear and "had been given 'reasonable attention' during the
planning process." Id at 476-77.
49. See CONN. GEN. STAT. §8-186 (2005). Chapter 132 of the municipal development
code allows the state to take developea land as part of an economic deveiopment pian.




53. Id. at 490.
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on the Court's rulings in Berman and Midkiff the term "public use"
had long been interpreted to include "public purpose"; 54 second, that
the area to be taken was "sufficiently distressed" to justify the taking
and that deference should be given to the state legislature's
determination; 55 and finally, that promoting economic development is
a valid public use.
56
The Court recognized that governments may not take the land
of a private citizen for the sole benefit of another private citizen;57
however, the Court reasoned that the taking in Kelo was orchestrated
in accordance with a "carefully considered" development plan that was
meant to benefit the public through economic revitalization. 5' The
Court further reasoned that the "public purpose" was not mere pretext
for a benefit to a private individual (even though the taken land would
not be opened to the general public) because the taking was not meant
to benefit a particular private entity.59 To support this reasoning, the
Court looked to Berman and Midkiff to suPort the broad interpretation
that "public use" includes public purposes.
Second, the Court deferred to the state legislature's decision
that the area was not blighted, but rather "sufficiently distressed to
justify a program of economic rejuvenation.",6 1 To support this
proposition, the Court merely noted that the city's plans were
"carefully formulated., 62
The Court again looked to Berman and Midkiff to support its
conclusion that there was no proper way to exempt economic
development from the "traditionally broad understanding of public
purpose. ' 63 In addition, Justice Stevens looked to Berman for the
54. Id. at 477-82.
55. Id. at 484.
56. Id. The Court also stated that "there is no principled way" to differentiate economic
development form other recognized public uses. Id.
57. Id. at 477.
58. Id. at 478.
59. Id. The land was eventually leased to Corcoran Jennison, a private development
firm. Id. at 476.
60. See supra note 25. Justice Stevens mentioned the statement made by Justice Holmes
referring to the "inadequacy of the use by the general public as a universal test" for the "public
use" clause. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480 (quoting Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200
U.S. 527, 531 (1906)).
61. Id.at483.
62. Id. The closest thing to a precedent supporting this proposition is Lingle v. Chevron,
U.S.A., cited later in the opinion, which is a regulatory takings case stating that the use of a
test requiring a reasonable certainty that the public benefit will happen "would empower--and
might often require--courts to substitute their predictive judgments for those of elected
legislatures." Id. at 488 (citing Lingle v. Chevron, U.S.A., 125 S. Ct. 2074, 2085 (2005)).
63. Id. at 485.
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proposition that a public benefit may be best implemented by a private
entity,64 and looked to Midkiff for the proposition that federal courts
should not be involved in determining the "wisdom of takings."
65
Justice Stevens then used these propositions to justify striking down
the petitioners assertion that there should be some reasonable
assurance that the public benefit used to justify the takings would
occur.
6 6
Justice Stevens then concluded by stating that nothing in the
ruling was meant to preclude the states from imposing their own rules
regarding the use of eminent domain. 67 Rather, he stated that the
Court's only power in this case was to determine if the city's use of
eminent domain violated the "public use" clause of the Fifth
Amendment.
68
Justice Kennedy, in his concurring opinion, stated that in the
future there may be a circumstance where stricter scrutiny should be
exercised in reviewing the validity of the use of eminent domain in
taking private property for the benefit of another private entity.69 He
declined, however, to clarify when such a higher level of scrutiny
would be warranted, except to say that a taking for a purely economic
70benefit alone would not be enough to trigger such scrutiny. It seems
Kennedy has left open an intriguing avenue that may eventually have
the effect of bringing Fifth Amendment takings cases more in line with
Free Speech and Equal Protection cases, where strict scrutiny is often
employed under certain circumstances. 7
1
In her dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas
and Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor outlined the three
accepted circumstances where eminent domain is properly used:
First, the sovereign may transfer private property to
public ownership - such as for a road, a hospital, or a
military base. Second, the sovereign may transfer private
64. Id. at 486 (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954)).
65. Id. at 488 (quoting Haw. Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242 (1984)).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 489.
68. Id. at 490.
69. Id. at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
/u. Jd. ( ,ennedy, J., concurring).
71. Steven J. Eagle, Kelo v. City of New London: A Tale of Pragmatism Betrayed, in
EMINENT DOMAIN USE AND ABUSE: KELO IN CONTEXT 195, 211 (Dwight H. Merrian & Mary
Massaron Ross eds., 2006) ("When all is said and done, the U.S. Supreme Court will attempt
to split the difference with a relaxed definition of "public use," enforced through a higher level
ofjudicial scrutiny ....").
2006)
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property to private parties, often common carriers, who
make the property available for the public's use-such as
with a railroad, a public utility, or a stadium .... [Third,]
we have allowed that, in certain circumstances and to
meet certain exigencies, takings that serve a public
purpose also satisfy the Constitution even if the property
is destined for subsequent private use.72
Justice O'Connor stated that the Court's previous rulings in both
Berman and Midkiff allowed the use of eminent domain to remedy a
situation where the property in question was injurious to the public.73
The property in question in Kelo, according to Justice O'Connor,
therefore did not fall within the three circumstances where eminent
domain may be properly used.
74
Justice Thomas also wrote a dissenting opinion, in which he
reiterated the points made by Justice O'Connor and went on to point
out that the harm of this decision would fall disproportionately on poor
minorities.
75
V. LEGISLATIVE AND PUBLIC BACKLASH
In Kelo, the United States Supreme Court suggested that state
governments were free to pass laws that were more restrictive of
government use of the eminent domain power.76 A large and growing
group of public, governmental, and private actors has emerged since
Kelo to do just that - protect individual property rights against purely
economic takings.
The Institute for Justice, for instance, which represented the
property owners in Kelo, 77 has begun a nation-wide lobbying
campaign called "Hands off My Home. 78 The goal of the campaign,
72. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 498 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
73. Id. at 504 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 521-22 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 489.
77. Institute For Justice, Cases, New London, Connecticut, Kelo v. New London:
Lawsuit Challenging Eminent Domain Abuse in New London, Connecticut,
http://www.ij.org/private_property/connecticut/index.html (last visited October 24, 2006).
78. Web Release, Institute for Justice, IJ's $3 Million National Campaign Tells
Lawmakers: "Hands Off My Home" (June 29, 2005), http://www.ij.org/private property
/castle/6_29_05pr.html.
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which is operated through the Institute for Justice's Castle Coalition,79
is to give ordinary citizens the means to combat eminent domain abuse
in their communities. To do this, the campaign advocates for stricter
state laws concerning purely economic takings and asks government
officials to pledge to oppose eminent domain abuse.
8
'
The Institute for Justice also submitted a petition for rehearing
to the Supreme Court for the Kelo case. 82 In the petition, the Institute
for Justice specifically rebutted Justice Stevens, who stated that the
holding in Kelo would not result in the "hypothetical cases" and
"parade of horribles" that Justice O'Connor warned of in her dissent. 83
The petition cited a large number of cases where local governments
commenced eminent domain proceedings against private land owners
where the property was to be transferred to another private party for
purely economic benefit. 84  The United States Supreme Court
nonetheless rejected the petition and refused to rehear the case. 85
Kelo also has triggered strong governmental responses against
abuses of eminent domain. 86 State and federal legislators have
submitted new bills to curb eminent domain abuse almost as fast as
private developers and governments are clamoring to exploit the
decision. 87 So far, forty-seven states have passed laws limiting the
power of eminent domain, are considering bills that portend to limit
eminent domain abuse, have created resolutions condemning the Kelo
decision, and/or have pledged to do so in 2006.88 Some notable bills
are Alabama House Resolution 49A, which expresses "grave
disapproval" with the Kelo decision and passed the Alabama House of
79. Id. The Castle Coalition is a grassroots organization of activists across the country
that are fighting against eminent domain abuse. Id.
80. Castle Coalition, About Us, http://www.castlecoalition.org/profile/index.html (last
visited Oct. 24, 2006).
81. Id.
82. Petition for Rehearing, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 1158 (2005) (No. 04-
108) [hereinafter Petition].
83. Id. at 1.
84. Id. at 2-7.
85. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 1158 (2005). See also Web Release, Institute
for Justice, U.S. Supreme Court Denies Homeowners' Request to Rehear Kelo (Aug. 22,
2005), http://www.ij.org/private_property/connecticut/8_22_05pr.html [hereinafter Petition
Denial Article].
86. Eminent Domain Ruling Spurs Flurry of Legislation, MORTGAGENEWsDAILY.COM,
July 25, 2005, http://www.mortgagenewsdaily.com/7252005_SupremeCourtEmunent_
Domain.asp.
87. Compare Castle Coalition, State Legislative Actions, http://maps.castlecoalition.org/
legislation.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2006), with Petition, supra note 82.
88. See Castle Coalition, State Legislative Actions, http://maps.castlecoalition.org/
legislation.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2006).
2006]
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Representatives in a single day,8 9 Connecticut House Bill 5038, which
would exempt all residential property from eminent domain takings for
economic benefit, 90 and Maryland House Bills 44 and 79, both of
which propose amendments to the Maryland Constitution that would
limit the ability of the government to condemn private property.
91
Federal legislators have also been very active in trying to limit
eminent domain abuse. Since the Kelo decision, and up to the date of
this writing, there have been at least thirteen bills or resolutions in the
Senate and House of Representatives that propose limits on the power
of eminent domain,92 or simply express dissatisfaction toward the Kelo
decision.93 House Resolution 3135, for example, proposes using the
spending power to prohibit projects that receive any federal funding
from using the power of eminent domain to take private property for
purely economic benefit. 94 In fact, House Resolution 3135 is also one
of the most widely supported of the federal bills that proposes eminent
domain restriction, with 136 cosponsors. 95 It would seem, therefore,
that there has been wide-spread disapproval in Congress toward the
Supreme Court's holding in Kelo.
Finally, a new twist to the Kelo backlash occurred recently,
when BB&T, the ninth largest financial holdings corporation in the
United States, issued a statement that said it would not lend to
commercial developers who benefit from the government taking of
private land through the use of eminent domain. 96 This is yet another
example of the widespread disagreement with Kelo - even a lending
institution, which stands to benefit financially from the decision, is
willing to take a stand against it.
89. H.R. 49A, 2005 Reg. Sess. (Al. 2005).
90. H.B. 5038, 2006 Gen. Assem., Feb. Sess. (Ct. 2006).
91. See H.R. 44, 2006 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2006); See H.R. 79, 2006 Gen.
Assem., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2006).
92. See Castle Coalition, Current Proposed Federal Legislation on Eminent Domain,
http://www.castlecoalition.org/legislation/federal/index.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2006).
93. See H.R. Res. 340, 109th Cong. (2005) (passed the House by a vote of 365-33).
94. Private Property Rights Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 3135, 109th Cong. (2005).
95. Id.
96. Web Release, Institute for Justice, BB&T Respects Property Rights, Won't Fund
Eminent Domain Abuse (Jan. 25, 2006), http://www.ij.org/editorial/bbt-wont-fund-ED.html;
Web Release, Institute for Justice, Montgomery Bank Won't Finance Eminent Domain Abuse,
Second Bank within Week to Reject Eminent Domain for Private Gain (Feb. 6, 2006),
http://www.ij.org/editorial/2ndbank-not-to-fund-ED.html.
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VI. ANALYSIS
The Court expended a great deal of effort, in its majority
opinion, comparing the situation in Kelo to two previous eminent
domain cases that do not bear a very close factual resemblance to
Kelo.97  Additionally, the majority completely ignored the far more
analogous Poletown case.98 By doing so, the Court ignored the more
effective rule that the Michigan Supreme Court formulated in Wayne
v. Hathcock, the decision that overturned Poletown.
99
A. Is Kelo more like Poletown than Berman or Midkiff?
To make an accurate determination about what kind of effect
the United States Supreme Court's holding in Kelo v. New London will
have, it is important to ask one question: is the situation in Kelo more
like that in Berman and Midkiff or is it more like the situation in
Poletown? The majority tried very hard to analogize Kelo to the
former cases to justify its opinion, 100 but ignored some very stark
differences that make it far more akin to Poletown.
The Court glossed over significant differences between Kelo
and Berman, on the one hand, and Midkiff on the other. The Court
ignored the important distinction that the property in Kelo was not
solely responsible for the social ill to be remedied by the taking, as
were the areas at issue in Berman and Midkiff l0' Although the takings
in Kelo were justified as necessary for the economic rejuvenation of
the city,10 2 the Fort Trumbull area was not more responsible than other
areas of the city for the distressed economy, as was found in Midkiff10 3
In addition, no conditions of blight were present, as in Berman.10 4 The
Court tried to dismiss this dichotomy, in a footnote, by stating that the
properties at issue in Strickley and Berman were not harmful to the
97. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
98. Compare Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 and Poletown Neighborhood Council v, Detroit, 304
N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981). In both cases, property was taken through eminent domain in order
to complete a plan of economic revitalization. See id. The property in both cases was to be
given to a private entity for development. See id. Also, neither area was considered in a
condition injurious to the public. See id.
99. See Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).
100. See supra Part III.
101. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
102. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480.
103. See id at 499 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The property in question was part of a land
oligopoly that was causing distress to the fee simple market in Hawaii. Id.
104. Id. at 498 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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public.1 0 5 However, the Court had already relied on the ruling in
Berman that "community redevelopment programs need not... be on
a piecemeal basis - lot by lot, building by building,"'1 6 to illustrate
that the area as a whole was in need of redevelopment because of the
predominantly "blighted" condition.'0 7 It seems, therefore, that this
dichotomy is not so easily explained away, as the majority attempted
to do.
Kelo, on the other hand, bears a striking resemblance to
Poletown. In both cases, property was taken in an area that was not
considered blighted, or otherwise injurious to the public. 10 8 Also, in
both cases, the public benefit that was to be accomplished via the
taking was economic in nature, and the property was to be given to a
private party for development. 0 9 The one main difference between
Kelo and Poletown is that in Poletown, the private beneficiary was
known to be General Motors, 110 whereas in Kelo, the private
beneficiary was not specified at the time of the takings."' Nonetheless,
in Kelo the proposed development would not be open to the general
public. 112 Therefore, why should it make any difference if the private
beneficiary was not known at the time of the taking? Nowhere in
Justice Chase's statement from Calder v. Bull, which was quoted by
Justice Stevens, does it say that a "law that takes property from A.[sic]
and gives it to B" is invalid, 113 unless B happens to be a specific
private entity, in which case the law is then valid. This difference,
therefore, seems to be one that was artificially fabricated by the
majority to dissuade dissenters from making any comparisons to the
Poletown decision, which was overruled in the Michigan Supreme
Court in the 2004 case of Wayne v. Hathcock.114 If history is any
indication of what will happen in the future, and hopefully it is, the
Kelo ruling will suffer the same fate as the Poletown ruling.
105. Id. at485n.13.
106. Id. at 481 (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 35 (1954)).
107. Id.
108. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
109. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 485-86.
110. See Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 457 (Mich. 1981).
111. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 476.
112. Id. at 478-79.
113. Id. at 478 n.5 (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1798)).
114. 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).
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B. The Wayne v. Hathcock Alternative
In 2004, the Michigan Supreme Court overruled the 1980
holding in Poletown."15 Instead of following the extremely unpopular
precedent set in the Poletown case, the Michigan Supreme Court
decided to create a new rule for when the government may use the
power of eminent domain to take private property." 6 This new test
identifies three specific sets of circumstances where this type of taking
would be considered valid." 7
First, condemnations in which private land is constitutionally
transferred by the condemning authority to a private entity involve
"public necessity of the extreme sort otherwise impracticable."" 8
Some of the examples given by Judge Young, who wrote the opinion
in Hathcock, of these types of condemnations were "highways,
railroads, canals, and other instrumentalities of commerce."' 19 This
type of condemnation was valid, according to the court, because it
allowed essential projects to commence without having to pay private
landowners exorbitant prices for the land taken.1 20 This is the same
type of situation the United States Supreme Court reviewed in
Strickley12 1 and is consistent with how Justice Thomas has interpreted
the original intent of the Fifth Amendment takings clause. 22
Second, the transfer of condemned property to a private entity
is consistent with the Constitution's "public use" requirement when
the private entity remains accountable to the public in its use of that
property.12 3 Therefore, as long as the public maintained a measure of
control over the property after the taking, it would be considered
valid. 124
Finally, condemned land may be transferred to a private entity
when the selection of the land to be condemned is itself based on
public concern. 125 This provision would allow the use of eminent
domain to take private property when it is necessary to eliminate
115. Id.
116. See id. at 781.
117. Id. at 781-82.
118. Id. at 781.
119. Id. at 781. (citing Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 478
(Mich. 1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting)).
120. Id. at 782.
121. See supra Part lI.A.
122. See supra note 13.
123. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 782.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 783,
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conditions of "blight" or some other condition that is considered
injurious to the public good. 126 This was also the justification given by
the Supreme Court in both Berman and Midkiff 127 In Berman the
taking was justified due to the blighted condition of the area to be
taken, 128 and in Midkiff the land to be taken was part of a land
oligopoly that was economically damaging to the public.' 29 The taking
in Kelo would not fall under this test because the area itself was not the
cause of the public harm that the taking was meant to remedy.
While the doctrine of stare decisis did not require the Supreme
Court to follow the ruling of the Michigan Supreme Court when
deciding Kelo, it seems logical that they would have learned from the
debacle of the Poletown case. The United States Supreme Court
should have tried to avoid such a result by adopting a rule similar to
the one adopted in Hathcock. The argument for such a rule becomes
even more compelling when one realizes that nearly all of the major
precedents cited by the majority in Kelo could be justified on one or
more of the three circumstances for valid use of the eminent domain
power laid out in Hathcock.130 It seems unlikely that it was simple
ignorance that pushed the majority in Kelo to such a misguided result,
especially when one considers that Justices O'Connor and Thomas, in
their dissents were fully aware of the Poletown case. 131 Since the
Supreme Court has, unfortunately, refused to rehear the case, we will
never know why the majority ignored such an obviously workable and
far more reasonable alternative.
132
C. Robbing from the poor (or not quite so rich) to give to the rich(er)
Governments have often used eminent domain to take private
property from one business in order to benefit another private business
that they deem to be more desirable.' 33 A recent case where this very
situation occurred was 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster
126. Id.
127. See supra note 25.
128. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 29 (1954).
129. Haw. Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 232 (1984).
130. Compare Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527 (1904),
Berman, 348 U.S. at 29, and Midkiff 467 U.S. at 232, with Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 781-83.
131. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 503 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting);
Id. at 522 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
132. Petition, supra note 82.
133. Dean Starkman, Take and Give: Condemnation is Used to Hand One Business
Property ofAnother, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 1998, at Al.
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Redevelopment Agency.134 This case was also one of the few that
Justice Stevens actually discussed in his majority opinion in Kelo as
being an invalid use of the power of eminent domain.135 In this case,
Costco, a large retailer in the city of Lancaster, threatened to move
their operations from the city unless Lancaster would take the property
of 99 Cents Only Stores, which was located adjacent to Costco's store,
so that Costco could expand into that space. 136 The Lancaster
Redevelopment Agency argued that the taking would generate
increased tax revenue and, therefore, was for a public benefit.'37 The
District Court for the Central District of California granted summary
judgment to 99 Cents Only Stores on the grounds that the proposed
taking was not for a public use. 138 However this taking would have
created increased tax revenue and, therefore, would be valid under the
Supreme Court's ruling in Kelo.13 9
Costco lost this particular case; however, they have been one of
the most prolific abusers of the power of big business to put pressure
on local governments to use the eminent domain power for their
benefit. 140 While Costco is by no means the only large corporation that
has few qualms about abusing wealth and influence to procure land
through eminent domain, it has been involved in an inordinately high
number of controversial projects that involved the use of eminent
domain takings. 141 Costco has become so synonymous with the use of
eminent domain that one journalist has dubbed it the nation's
"Corporate Darth Vader of Eminent Domain." 142 Probably one of the
more egregious cases involving Costco involved the Cottonwood
Christian Center and the city of Cypress, California.143 The city of
Cypress attempted to take land, through the use of eminent domain,
that had been purchased by Cottonwood Christian Center, a church.
44
It was well-known that the intended beneficiary of the taking would be
Costco, whose president - in response to a Wall Street Journal Article
on the situation 45 - had the nerve to blame the church for buying the
134. 237 F.Supp.2d 1123 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
135. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 487 (citing 99 Cents Only Stores, 237 F.Supp.2d. at 1123).
136. 99 Cents Only Stores, 237 F.Supp.2d at 1126.
137. Id. at 1129.
138. Id. at 1130.
139. See Ea~le, supra note 71, at 205.
140. See GREENHUT, supra note 5, at 192.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 193.
144. Id.
145. Editorial, The First Church of Costco, WALL ST. J., May 30, 2002, at A14.
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land in the first place. 146 It is this type of corporate hubris that makes
the government's eminent domain power, especially after Kelo, so
dangerous to property owners. Even more unfortunate is the fact that it
is not only businesses that are at risk, but people's homes as well.
In their dissents in the Kelo case, both Justice O'Connor and
Justice Thomas mentioned that the inevitable consequence of Kelo
would be that those with less political and financial influence would be
the ones who were disproportionately affected. 147 In Berman, ninety-
seven percent of the people whose property was taken were poor
African-American people. 4 8 Similarly, in Poletown, the neighborhood
taken for the building of a General Motors plant was made up almost
entirely of elderly, lower income people. 149 The petitioners in Kelo
may not have been poor, but they certainly were not rich, or, at least,
not rich enough to keep the city of New London from finding a more
lucrative use for their homes.
On the other hand, based on the wealth at their disposal and
their importance to the economic health of a community, private
companies have a disproportionate influence over the political process.
These private companies, therefore, will benefit most from the Kelo
decision. In Poletown, General Motors, after closing three other
facilities, was able to assert pressure on the city of Detroit by
promising to build an assembly plant if the city could provide a
suitable site.' This is an excellent example of the type of
disproportionate influence Justice O'Connor warned of in her dissent,
where she stated that "the beneficiaries are likely to be those citizens
with disproportionate influence and power in the political process,
including large corporations and development firms." 151 Justice
Thomas also supported this argument with the following:
[E]xtending the concept of public purpose to
encompass any economically beneficial goal guarantees
that these losses will fall disproportionately on poor
communities. Those communities are not only
146. Id.
147. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 505 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(stating that the beneficiaries will likely be those with greater degrees of political influence);
id at 521 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that the losses from this decision are likely to fall on
poor communities).
148. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 30 (1954).
149. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 522 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
150. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 469 (Mich. 1981)
(Ryan, J., dissenting).
151. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 505 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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systematically less likely to put their lands to the
highest and best social uses, but are also the least
politically powerful.1
52
The statistics, cited by Justice Thomas in his dissent in Kelo,
are also startling. They show that the vast majority of people that were
displaced by urban renewal projects in the 1950s and 1960s were poor
minorities. 153 It would be naive to think that these trends would not
continue under the Supreme Court's mandate in Kelo.
In October of 2005, in City of Norwood v. Homey, the Ohio
Court of Appeals upheld the ruling of the trial court that the city of
Norwood, Ohio rightfully condemned the property of the petitioners
because the area in question was "deteriorating."' 154 The land in
question was to be transferred to a private real estate developer for
redevelopment into a large scale retail and residential complex. 155
Much of the Ohio Court of Appeals justification rested on a study,
paid for by the private developer after choosing the land needed for the
project, that found the area was deteriorating. Amazingly, part of the
reason cited in the study for the area's need for redevelopment was the
"diversity of ownership," which basically meant that the area should
be taken because many people owned their homes and businesses. 
157
Thankfully, the Ohio Supreme Court recently ruled that the city of
Norwood could not use its power of eminent domain to take the
private property of the petitioners. 158 In a ruling that will hopefully set
an example for courts throughout the country, the Ohio Supreme Court
explicitly rejected the Supreme Courts ruling in Kelo and, instead,
chose to protect the property rights of individuals. 1
59
Another case of eminent domain abuse is occurring in Riviera
Beach, Florida where the city is attempting to take the property of
between 5,000 and 6,000 predominantly black residents so the area can
be redeveloped into a multi-billion dollar marina, waterfront retail and
152. Id. at 521 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 522 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing B. FRIEDEN & L. SAGALAYN, DOWNTOWN,
INC.: How AMERICA REBUILDS CITIES 17, 28 (1989)).
154. Norwood v. Homey, 830 N.E.2d 381, 388 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005).
155. Id. at 384-85.
156. Web Release, Institute for Justice, Ohio Supreme Court Hears Eminent Domain
Abuse Case (Jan. 10, 2006), http://www.ij.org/private_property/norwood/1_ 10_06pr.html.
157. Id.
158. Web Release, Institute for Justice, Ohio Supreme Court Rules Unanimously to
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residential area. 60 The residents to be displaced were selected because
their property was deemed to be "blighted" based on a 2001 survey
that has been shown to have a number of holes in it.161 While it is
clearly true that a large portion of the homes in Riviera Beach are
"blighted," 162 what is truly remarkable about this case is not whether
the homes are blighted, but rather the sheer number of homes subject
to condemnation, which is estimated at 2,000.13 In fact, this taking
could eclipse the largest taking on record - the 1954 taking in the
Berman case of 5,000, mostly black, residents of Washington, D.C.
164
The statement of Lord Acton, quoted above, seems very fitting
in this situation. Since the Supreme Court's ruling in Kelo, the number
of new cases where eminent domain is sought to remove lower and
middle class people from their property in the name of "economic
development" has grown. 165 Thankfully, many state legislatures have
responded to Kelo by drafting new laws to limit the uses of eminent
domain to protect the property rights of individual citizens from
takings such as those in Kelo and in Poletown.166 Unfortunately,
thanks to Kelo, these changes will come too late to protect many
private citizens from losing the rights and homes.
VII. CONCLUSION
Justice Stevens's statement that states are permitted to make
laws that restrict government uses of eminent domain more stringently
than the federal laws shows the Court's uneasiness with its decision in
Kelo. 167 By saying this in the majority opinion, it appears as if Justice
Stevens is unwilling to stand behind the opinion completely. 168 In
other words, the obvious reason for Justice Stevens to take the time to
160. Joyce Howard Price, Florida City Considers Eminent Domain, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 3,
2005, available at http://www.washtimes.com/nationa/20051003-122623-2136r.htm.
161. Pat Beall, Riviera Beach Eminent Domain Case Draws National Spotlight, PALM
BEACH POST, Dec. 11, 2005, available at http://www.palmbeachpost.com/politics
/content/localnews/epaper/2005/12/11/cia blight 1211 .html.
162. Id. ("At the time of the 2000 U.S. Census, one out of every four homes in Riviera
Beach had three rooms or less, a figure associated with overcrowding. Eighty had no
plumbing; 327 had no source of heat at all.").
163. Price, supra note 160.
164. Id.
165. See Castle Coalition, Current Controversies, http://www.castlecoalition.org/current
controversies/index.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2006).
166. See supra Part IV.
167. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489 (2005).
168. See Eagle, supra note 71, at 208.
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emphasize something that any state lawmaker should already know -
that the states are permitted to pass any laws not prohibited by the
Constitution - is to put the onus on the states. In her dissent,
Justice O'Connor voiced her disapproval of this approach by stating
the following: "States play many important functions in our system of
dual sovereignty, but compensating for our refusal to properly enforce
the Federal Constitution (and a provision meant to curtail state action,
no less) is not among them.' ' 70
The Supreme Court, in Kelo, has done severe damage to the
right of citizens to own property, with the inevitable result being that
the less privileged members of American society will bare the ultimate
brunt of the decision. 17 1 One of the more unfortunate aspects of the
Kelo decision is that the Court chose to apply federal precedent that
was far less analogous to the situation than precedent set in a state
court. 1 7 2 By doing so, the Supreme Court, in essence, repeated errors
that had been committed in the past and later remedied. 173 Judging by
the volume of the public outcry against the decision, it seems that Kelo
will likely follow the same course as the Poletown case. It is sad,
however, that by the time the Kelo decision is rendered obsolete,
whether by judicial or legislative action, many more people of limited
means will likely have lost their most dear possession - their home.
Fortunately, there are already many reasons to be hopeful that
the Supreme Court's decision in Kelo will have only a limited effect
on the public as a whole. This is illustrated by the legislative action in
a large number of states attempting to curtail government abuse of
eminent domain as well as state court cases that will have the same
effect. 1
74
Hopefully, in the future the Kelo decision will amount to
nothing more than a bad decision that caused a relatively minimal loss
of personal property. Unfortunately, it will likely cause state
legislators and state judges to waste a great deal of time and effort in
rendering Kelo obsolete - time that could have been better spent if
the Supreme Court had simply chosen to protect individual property
rights. Furthermore, the Court would not have had to look far - the
Michigan Supreme Court and its ruling in the Hathcock case - to find
169. Id.
170. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 504 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
171. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
172. See supra Part VI.A.
173. See supra Part VI.B.
174. See supra Part V.
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a much better alternative.1 75 By reiterating the Hathcock ruling, the
Court would have been able to uphold all of the federal precedents
cited in the Kelo opinion, while still protecting personal property
rights. 176
Hopefully, with the recent affirmation of Chief Justice Roberts
and Justice Alito, the Supreme Court will be infused with a new
perspective on the Constitutional validity of the public use clause.
175. See supra Part VI.B.
176. Id.
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